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# Democracy and Democratization in East Asia: Myth or Reality

CHRISTIAN SCHAFFERER

# Modern East Asia

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## Table of Contents

<i>Tables</i>	<i>i</i>
<i>Figures</i>	<i>ii</i>
<b>Global democratic development and (South)East Asia</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>MONGOLIA</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>PHILIPPINES</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>SOUTH KOREA</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>TAIWAN</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>THAILAND</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>UNPRECEDENTED ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE MIDDLE CLASSES</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>THE CATHOLIC CHURCH</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>CHANGES IN THE POLICIES OF EXTERNAL ACTORS AND NEW INSTITUTIONS</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>DEMONSTRATION EFFECT</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Consolidating democracies</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>CONSOLIDATION IN (SOUTH)EAST ASIA</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Notes</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>25</b>



## Tables

1	CLASSIFICATION OF ASIAN STATES AS OF THE END OF 2000	3
2	INDICATORS FOR MONGOLIA, TAIWAN, SOUTH KOREA, PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND	11

## Figures

1 TYPES OF PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS

18

## DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATISATION IN EAST ASIA: MYTH OR REALITY?

Christian Schafferer

*At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a large number of states democratised. This global wave of democratisation has been the issue of numerous academic discussions. The results of these various analyses, however, have only vaguely explained the true forces behind the political developments in (South) East Asia. In this paper, the common and indigenous causes of democratisation in the region's five new democracies, South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, Thailand and the Philippines, will be pinpointed. Moreover, current obstacles to the consolidation of (South) East Asia's democratic achievements will be examined.*

### **Global democratic development and (South)East Asia**

Joseph Schumpeter defined democracy as a system “for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”<sup>1</sup> Robert Dahl elaborated on Schumpeter’s minimal definition in his “Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition” by arguing that in a democracy not only extensive political competition is necessary to enable people to form and express their political preferences in a meaningful way, but also substantial levels of freedom.<sup>2</sup> Dahl, thus, argues that democracy rests on two pillars, namely on political rights, e.g. elections, and on civil liberties, e.g. the right of assembly and freedom of speech. Whether a country is democratic or not could thus be measured on the existence of those two pillars.

One of the leading organisations monitoring the progress and decline of political rights and civil liberties in about two hundred countries and sixty related territories is Freedom House. Since the 1970s, this non-profit and non-partisan organisation has released annual reports reflecting the real-world situation caused by governmental and non-governmental factors, and not the intentions of governments or the political rights and civil liberties outlined in a polity's constitution. Freedom House derives its information from a wide range of sources such as regional experts, consultants and human rights specialists. The organisation defines political rights as those rights which enable "people to participate freely in the political process."<sup>3</sup> By the term "political process", Freedom House means "the

system by which the polity chooses the authoritative policy makers and attempts to make binding decisions affecting the national, regional or local community."<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, it is believed that "in a free society this means the right of all adults to vote and compete for public office, and for elected representatives to have a decisive vote on public policies."<sup>5</sup> Civil liberties are defined by the organisation as those "freedoms to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy from the state."<sup>6</sup> Based on this definition, and using a catalogue of specific questions, Freedom House rates the existence of political rights and civil liberties in about two hundred countries and sixty related territories separately on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the existence and 7 the non-existence of such rights and liberties. Finally, the observed countries and territories are assigned to one of three categories (free, partly free, not free) by averaging the ratings they received.

As of the end of 2000, almost five out of ten countries in the world were assigned to the category of free polities, three out of ten to the category of partly-free states and less than three out of ten to the non-free category.<sup>7</sup> In terms of world population, approximately forty percent resided in free countries, 23 percent in partly-free ones and about 36 percent in countries declared not-free.<sup>8</sup> The year 2000 marked a record high of the number of people residing in free countries, which can be seen as a result of the global wave of democratisation that was set off in the early 1970s in Europe.

There were five changes which played a significant role in triggering of that wave of democratisation:<sup>9</sup>

- the deepening legitimacy crisis of authoritarian regimes caused by a global acceptance of democratic values and institutions and by military and economic failures;
- the unprecedented economic growth in previously less developed countries, which raised living standards and expanded the urban middle class;
- the striking changes in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic Church manifested in the Second Vatican Council of the 1960s and the transformation of national churches from defenders of the landowners to the defenders of the poor;
- the changing policies of many international and regional bodies and governments.
- the demonstration effect.

This wave also swept across East Asia and Southeast Asia. At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, three East Asian and two Southeast Asian countries were evolving into democracies: Taiwan, South Korea, Mongolia, the Philippines and Thailand.

**TABLE 1 CLASSIFICATION OF ASIAN STATES AS OF THE END OF 2000**

Type	Asia				
	East Asia	Southeast Asia	South Asia	Southwest Asia	Central Asia
Free	Japan (1/2), Taiwan (1/2), South Korea (2/2), Mongolia (2/3)	Thailand (2/3), Philippines (2/3)	India (2/3)	Cyprus (1/1), Israel (1/3)	
Partly Free		Singapore (5/5), Malaysia (5/5), Indonesia (3/4)	Bangladesh (3/4), Sri Lanka (3/4), Nepal (3/4)	Armenia (4/4), Azerbaijan (6/5), Georgia (4/4), Jordan (4/4), Kuwait (4/5)	
Not Free	China (7/7), North Korea (7/7)	Myanmar (7/7), Cambodia (6/6), Laos (7/6), Vietnam (7/6), Brunei (7/5)	Pakistan (6/5), Maldives (6/5), Bhutan (7/6)	Afghanistan (7/7), Iran (7/7), Iraq (7/7), Syria (7/7), Lebanon (6/5), Saudi Arabia (7/7), Yemen (5/6), Oman (6/5), United Arab Emirates (6/5), Qatar (6/6), Bahrain (7/6)	Kazakhstan (6/5), Tajikistan (6/6), Turkmenistan (7/7), Uzbekistan (7/6)

Based on: Freedom House, *Freedom in the World* (<http://216.119.117.183/research/freeworld/2001/table1.htm>, December 2001).

As of the end of 2000, twenty percent of the 45 countries comprising Asia were democracies, twenty-five percent were categorised ‘partly free’ and more than half of the countries as ‘not free.’ Four out of six East Asian countries were assigned to the category of ‘free’ countries. With the exception of Japan, all these countries democratised during the last two decades. The transition in these countries was by a process of cooperation between the ruling regime and the opposition. In Southeast Asia, two out ten nations were assigned to the category of ‘free’ societies. Thailand’s transition was one of cooperation between the elite in power and the opposition, whereas the Philippine one was one in which the leadership was overthrown by a powerful civil-rights movement. An overall assessment of the democratic achievements of these new democracies leads to the conclusion that Taiwan is the most democratic. Moreover, Freedom House gave Taiwan the same ratings as were given to most member states of the European Union, such as Germany, France and Italy. It also outperformed the European Union member state of Greece (political rights: 2; civil liberties: 3) in terms of civil liberties and several EU applicants, such as Bulgaria (political rights: 2; civil rights: 3) and Turkey (political rights: 4; civil liberties: 5) in terms of political rights and civil liberties.

The democratic achievements have shed dark light on the so-called ‘Asian Value’ debate, which has dominated the academic discussion on democracy in Asia: In June

1993, the second UN World Conference on Human Rights was held in Vienna. In a preparatory meeting in Bangkok, Asian countries agreed on what is termed the Bangkok Declaration of Human Rights. In this document, Asian states made it clear that human rights may be interpreted by each state itself and denies other states any right of interference in that interpretation. Although the document was signed by almost all the states comprising Asia, it does not necessarily reflect the attitudes of all governments, especially not of the few that were democratically elected. It should be noted here that Asian civic groups fiercely protested against the claims made in the Bangkok Declaration and made it clear that they believe liberal democracy to be a common demand among the Asian people. The conference itself sparked numerous discussions in political and academic circles about the universality of human rights versus the existence of Asian values. By talking about Asian values, scholars and politicians usually equate them with Confucianism and restrict the discussion to the human rights situation in China and Singapore. A philosophical touch was added by theorists of classical studies, who rather than observing current developments in East Asia, especially in the NEADs (New East Asian Democracy), had spent most of their time reading books on Confucianism and Max Weber's outdated and extravagant analyses, which have led them to insist that Confucianism is incompatible with democratic values and that, therefore, democratic institutions could never be established in these countries. But who cares about Confucianism in the 21<sup>st</sup> century? Civil disobedience has been the catchword of the democratic revolutions in Mongolia, Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines. Max Weber is dead and so is Confucianism *per se*. What the self-declared experts term 'Confucianism' is just like any other '-ism' which existed in all authoritarian/totalitarian polities. With modernisation, urbanisation, a rising middle class and a new political elite emerging, this '-ism' began to disappear. This is what has happened in the NEADs and not only there but also in Europe and other countries in which modernisation has taken place. Former Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui, the most outspoken critic of the Asian value theory, once said that Taiwan's democratic achievements toppled the myth of Asian values being incompatible with democracy.

### **Mongolia**

The People's Republic of Mongolia was founded in 1924 and replaced the constitutional monarchy.<sup>10</sup> It had been a satellite of the former USSR. In 1986, President J. Batmönh repeatedly announced the implementation of a 'Mongolian Glasnost', which appeared to

be necessary given the crumbling state of the USSR, Mongolia's most important trading partner at the time. Another reason was growing dissatisfaction among the people of Mongolia with the government's economic policies. The Mongolian communist party conducted surveys on the people's attitude towards members of parliament, which was published in the party organ Unen (lit. truth) in 1988. The report said that sixty-two percent of the interviewees were dissatisfied with the performance of parliament members. The regime thus decided to implement a far-reaching party reform and to work on a new constitution.<sup>11</sup>

In addition, diplomatic relations were established with the People's Republic of China, the United States and several European countries.<sup>12</sup>

At the same time, Michael Gorbachev made public his intention to withdraw soviet troops from Mongolia. The first troops left the country in 1987, and by 1992 all military installations and personnel had been removed from the country.

In the autumn of 1989, the first opposition party was formed, the Mongolian Democratic Union. The party organised several large demonstrations with some 40,000 people demanding free elections, referenda on important political issues and the implementation of a market economy. Soon, the government agreed on the holding of free parliamentary elections in July 1990 and on the drafting of a new constitution, which turned parliament into a two-chamber institution, with the lower house consisting of 430 members who were directly elected for a five-year term, and the upper house comprising fifty members who were elected by the lower house. The number of seats allocated to each party in the upper chamber was proportional to the number of seats held by that party in the lower house.

The July 1990 parliamentary election was a watershed in Mongolia's political development, even though the opposition won less than twenty percent of seats. Competition was fairly tough with more than two thousand candidates from six parties contesting 430 seats.<sup>13</sup>

The process of democratisation and liberalisation in Mongolia was driven by negotiations between the ruling party and the opposition. Moreover, it was a non-violent one.

## **Philippines**

The Philippines had been a Spanish colony between 1565 and 1898, when the US gained possession after the Spanish-American War. Between the years 1941 and 1945, the Japanese occupied the Philippines. In 1946, the Philippines finally achieved independence.

Ferdinand Marcos, first elected as president in 1965, declared martial law in 1972 to circumvent a constitutional two-term limit. A blatantly rigged election caused wide-spread demonstrations in 1986, leading to the so-called “people power” revolution which finally ousted Ferdinand Marcos.

Democratisation began with opposition leader Corazon Aquino taking office. There had however already been several attempted coups by right-wing elements in the military and other opponents. According to the constitution, the presidential term is limited to six years without a second term being possible. Former chief-of-staff Fidel Ramos took over the presidency in 1992. Under his administration, GDP grew considerably and he weakened some of the family-owned business monopolies which had accumulated substantial political power. Nevertheless, the economic situation of the poor did not change significantly. Street demonstrations in 1997 sent a signal to Ramos telling him not to try to call for a constitutional amendment allowing him to stay in office for a second term.

The Philippine transition has been brought about by the opposition without cooperation with the ruling regime.

### **South Korea**

Korea was divided along the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel during the closing days of World War II. By 1987, there had been three military dictatorships in South Korea: Syngman Rhee (1948-1960), Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) and Chun Doo Hwan (1980-1987).

After the assassination of President Park Chung Hee in October 1979, Chun Doo Hwan and a group of senior general officers staged a successful intra-military putsch on 17 May 1980. The subsequent promulgation of Martial Law Decree No.10 gave the authority the right to disband all political parties and purge its leaders. Student demonstrations against the new regime were widespread and led to the Kwangju Incident of 1980. The brutality of the security forces prompted several thousand citizens to join the demonstrations. During nine days of violent clashes up to 2,000 people were killed by the security forces. The aborted demonstration was a shock to the people, especially the student population.

1987 was a turning point in Korea’s democratisation since it was the year that the failed democratisation effort of 1980 eventually succeeded. Society was outraged at the Chun regime’s announcement on 13 April 1987 which prohibited all political discussion on constitutional revision to allow direct presidential elections. Dissatisfaction and repulsion were no longer confined to certain sections of society, such as the students. About a

month later, Cardinal Kim Seoung Hoon revealed that a Seoul National University student, Park Jong Cheol, had been tortured to death during his interrogation by the police. This was another incident that fuelled the public anger.

Soon a national alliance was founded, comprising politicians, Catholic, Buddhist and Protestant leaders, the literary world, academic circles, women's organisations, farmers, the urban poor, artists, workers, journalists, the youth, and relatives of political prisoners. The National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution adopted action guidelines which appealed to citizens to sound car horns, turn on and off their television sets for ten minutes, toll church bells etc. On 10 June, the alliance organised a mass rally attended by some 240,000 people from 22 cities. This peaceful protest grew day by day and peaked in the "grand peace march" of 26 June. Over a million people from around the country took part in this rally for peace. Negotiations between the opposition and the Chun regime brought about the so-called "June 29 Declaration", in which Roh Tae Woo, the ruling party's presidential candidate, agreed to an 8-point democratisation package, which included direct presidential elections, the release of Kim Dae Jung, local self-governance, and guarantees for human rights.<sup>14</sup>

US pressure also contributed to the regime's acceptance of this 8-point package. Moreover, the Seoul Olympic Games, which were to be held a year later, made the government hesitate to use force against the demonstrators, as this might have caused a world-wide boycott.

## **Taiwan**

Taiwan became a Japanese colony in 1895 in accordance with the treaty of Shimonoseki, which brought an end to the Sino-Japanese War. During World War II, the United States reached an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek providing that Taiwan would be returned to China. The agreement was confirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945. The new regime under Chiang Kai-shek was a development-oriented authoritarian one: Although martial law and other laws severely restricted the civil liberties and political rights of the people, general economic prosperity was one of the regime's major goals. The period of liberalisation was initiated in the late 1970s by the late President Chiang Ching-kuo. It was consolidated by the regime's acceptance of the formation of an opposition party in 1986 and its lifting of the martial law decree a year later. President Lee Teng-hui continued Chiang's commitment to political reform after Chiang's death in January 1988. Although the KMT regime had liberalised Taiwan's political system in many ways, the op-

position insisted on fully-fledged democracy. The opposition was strongly supported by a nation-wide student movement. Lee Teng-hui faced a national crisis when some 22,000 students from around the island came to Taipei to demonstrate peacefully at Chiang Kai-shek memorial, not far from the presidential office. Shortly afterwards, President Lee went on television to promise constitutional reforms within three years and a speeding up of the democratic process.<sup>15</sup> These constitutional reforms paved the way for elections of all members of parliament and direct presidential elections. Taiwan entered the stage of democratisation with the parliamentary elections of 1991/92, when liberalisation was sufficiently advanced to allow the replacement of the regime. With the popular election of the head of state in March 1996, Taiwan completed its transition to democracy, a process in which US pressure and the opposition movement had played a significant role.

### **Thailand**

In 1932, a bloodless coup led to constitutional order with a limited political role of the king. For a long time, the military played an important role in Thai politics. Its legitimacy came from the observed necessity of protection. The military should protect the three pillars of Thai society (the Thai people, the religion and the constitutional monarchy) from communism. Communist threat was, indeed, a serious problem in the 1960s: Between 1965 and 1969, for instance, more than 1,000 clashes between government troops and communist rebels occurred. 34 out of the 71 Thai provinces were labelled “communist-infested” areas at the time.<sup>16</sup> Prior to the early 1970s, Thai politics was determined within the civilian and military bureaucracy. Outside forces, such as interest groups, had no impact on the decision-making process.<sup>17</sup> In 1968, the military junta promulgated a new constitution after ruling by temporary authoritarian charter. However, the same military regime abolished the constitution three years later and brought back the temporary charter, which triggered a successful student-led uprising in October 1973. A new period in Thai politics appeared to emerge with political parties playing an active role. Due to the weakness of and factionalism within the civilian political circles, the military again took control of the country in 1976, leaving behind the so-called “three shiny years of Thai democracy”.

The early 1990s were a watershed in Thailand’s democratisation. In 1991, Army Commander-in-Chief Suchinda Kraprayoon abrogated the constitution, dismissed the elected government and introduced temporary martial law. When he even tried to become prime minister, massive anti-military demonstrations took place in Bangkok in May 1992, in

which fifty people were shot dead. Suchinda was finally powerless to resist the democratic mood in the country. He was made understand that democratic values were already appreciated by the Thais. Neher notes:

He did not understand that Thais were embarrassed that their country had suffered another coup just at a time the world was moving toward more open and liberal regimes. He did not realise that his claim that the demonstrators were pawns of communist elements was deemed irrelevant to contemporary realities.<sup>18</sup>

A further watershed was the 1997 constitution because it increased political transparency and accountability: Members of parliament and government officials were required to provide a detailed report on all their assets within thirty days of taking office. The premier and members of the cabinet were obliged to make this report public.

In addition, the new constitution requires both houses of parliament to be elected directly by the people. In the past, members of the upper house had been appointed by the premier, which guaranteed a high percentage of politicians with a military background and thus hampered the democratisation process. Furthermore, the new constitution prescribes a full-scale decentralisation from the powerful Ministry of the Interior.

These two watersheds in Thailand's transition were caused by the growing opposition movement, which forced the regime to change the rules of the game, and by a government that was willing to co-operate.

### **The problem of legitimacy**

In previous centuries, the ruling elite derived its legitimacy from tradition, religion, the divine right of the kings, and social deference. However, in the twentieth century things changed and the traditional rationale for authoritarianism became undermined. New sources of legitimacy emerged: nationalism and ideology. The first may be fostered by a nation's enemy and weakened if there is none. The survival of the latter will finally depend on the changes in the socio-economic status of a polity, which was critically weakened in most authoritarian regimes of the Third Wave as a direct consequence of the oil-price shocks of 1973/4 and 1979.<sup>19</sup>

As to the new democracies in (South)East Asia, in each of these five states did the regime face a crisis of legitimacy caused by indigenous factors. Except for the Philippines, the regime entered negotiations with the opposition to overcome the crisis.

#### TAIWAN

The problem of legitimacy was historic in nature because of the fact that the regime mainly comprised mainland Chinese who came to Taiwan in 1949. The Taiwanese considered the Kuomintang a foreign regime with no right to rule the de-facto island-state. After their retreat to Taiwan, the ruling regime became aware of its deteriorating power and tried to foster its legitimacy with US support. This strategy involved the implementation of a land reform, several insurance programmes for labourers, military servicemen and government employees, and a sound system of local self-governance. Economic growth and social stability was the consequence. However, with the expulsion of the Kuomintang government from the UN in 1971 and the US termination of diplomatic relations with the regime in 1979 a new crisis of legitimacy emerged.

#### THAILAND

The military has played a decisive role in Thai politics, staging numerous coups and attempted coups since constitutional order was established in 1932. The legitimacy for taking control of the country derives from the idea that the military has to protect the nation from communist infiltration. In the past, this claim certainly had some truth in it. However, with no real communist threat and a society increasingly embracing democratic ideals, this source of legitimacy has disappeared. This became evident in 1992, when after a successful coup to oust a corrupt civilian government in order to “protect” the nation from “collapsing”, General Suchinda attempted to install himself as prime minister without having been elected. Large-scale demonstrations in Bangkok were the result, and Suchinda was finally forced to abandon the role of the military as the legitimate protector of the state.

#### THE PHILIPPINES

The crisis of legitimacy plagued dictator Ferdinand Marcos when he tried to circumvent a constitutional two-term limit on the presidency by declaring martial law in 1972. The “People Power” revolution in 1986 brought an end to Marco’s rule after the crisis of legitimacy reached a critical point following a blatantly rigged election.

## SOUTH KOREA

The first serious crisis of legitimacy occurred in 1979, when General Chun Doo Hwan after a successful inter-military *coup d'état* took over the leadership of the country. The Kwangju Incident of 1980 was the consequence of this crisis of legitimacy. The regime reached its lowest level of legitimacy in 1987, when Chun ignored the people's call for direct presidential elections and Cardinal Kim Seoung Hoon claim that a Seoul National University student, Park Jong Cheol, had been tortured to death during his interrogation by the police. To make things worse for the regime, top-ranking police officers were alleged to have been directly involved.<sup>20</sup>

## MONGOLIA

In the late 1980s, the question of legitimacy arose in Mongolia with the break-up of the USSR, the country's major economic partner. A serious crisis, however, was averted through the regime's willingness to negotiate with the opposition.

### **Unprecedented economic growth and the middle classes**

Economic growth and democracy are said to be correlated. There is the conventional wisdom that countries with a generally high income level tend to be democracies, an assumption that is undoubtedly true in most cases, Third-Wave democracies being no exception. The most developed economies of (South) East Asia's new democracies, Taiwan and South Korea, are also the region's most vibrant democracies.

**TABLE 2 INDICATORS FOR MONGOLIA, TAIWAN, SOUTH KOREA, PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND**

Polity	Population in millions		GDP per Capita in US\$ 1,000	Urban Pop. in %			Agriculture in %	
	1950	1999	1999	1950	1970	2000	1975	1999
Mongolia	0.8	3	2.3	19	45	63	n.a.	n.a.
Taiwan	7	22	16.1	n.a.	55	85	30	9
South Korea	20	47	13.3	21	41	86	46	11
Philippines	21	75	3.6	27	33	59	34	42
Thailand	20	61	6	10	13	21	73	40

SOURCE: ILO, FAO, MOEA

With the exception of Thailand, urbanisation has increased considerably in all of the new democracies in East Asia. South Korea and Taiwan have become the most urbanised of the five countries, with 85 percent of the population living in urban areas (Table 2).

South Korea and Taiwan have developed into industrialised countries, with the primary sector being marginalized: As of 1999, about ten percent of the workforce were em-

ployed in this sector, which contributed five percent to Korea's GDP and three percent to Taiwan's. On the Philippines and in Thailand about four out of ten people are employed in the primary sector. In the case of the Philippines, the primary sector accounts for twenty percent of GDP, whereas the figure is eight percentage points lower in Thailand. At the end of the 1990s, thirty-two percent of the Philippine population were living below the poverty line. In Thailand, the figure was thirteen percent. It was lowest in Taiwan, at just one percent. Although Mongolia is the poorest of all the new East Asian democracies, institutionalised obstacles to a consolidated democracy are more of a problem in Thailand and to an even greater extent on the feudalist Philippines (see page 17).

Unprecedented economic growth has been seen in South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, creating a new middle class that has played a crucial role in the transition there.

### **The Catholic Church**

Compared with the previous waves of democratisation, the Third Wave was a predominantly Catholic one. Huntington claims that Pope John XXIII was the initiator of a new Catholic commitment to democracy crafting with his personal style of commitment to a new Catholic church as expressed in his encyclicals. The Second Vatican Council was important as it stressed the need for and legitimacy of social change, and the importance of collegial action by bishops and priests. Huntington believes that the Catholic church was actively involved in the democratisation process: In the past, it supported the landowners and other oppressive institutions by providing them with legitimacy. Now, the church has changed into a powerful social institution opposing anti-democratic forces and depriving regimes of whatever legitimacy they may have claimed from religion, and providing protection, support, resources and even leadership to pro-democratic forces.<sup>21</sup> The changing role of the Catholic Church has also influenced the democratisation process in South Korea and on the Philippines. In the latter, Cardinal Sin was a key figure behind the mass demonstrations in 1986 which finally led to the downfall of Ferdinand Marcos. Although Protestant churches and followers outnumber Catholic ones in South Korea, it was indeed the Catholic leaders under Cardinal Kim who brought about democracy there. In this context, Huntington's analysis is accurate. However, the growing involvement of the Catholic Church in Korean and Philippine politics was not initiated by the Vatican. On the contrary, the Vatican was strictly opposed to any form of involvement, this being most evident in the Korean case: Catholicism came to Korea in 1784 during the Chosen Dynasty. It was viewed as an 'enemy to Korean culture and moral

values' and thus had only few supporters. Protestant missions from the US and Canada arrived in Korea exactly one hundred years later and adopted a different strategy. They tried to win supporters by establishing hospitals, schools, universities and other institutions of public interest.<sup>22</sup> Between 1961 and 1992, Catholicism increased from 1.5 percent to approximately five percent of the population and Protestantism from four percent to twenty percent. Protestant churches were split into two camps: the progressive Minjung communities and the conservative communities. The first tried to help the poor and called for the active involvement of the Protestant churches in politics. The latter aimed at establishing 'mega-churches', local religious communities with large memberships and multi-media performances during their services. The Minjung communities, on the other hand, promoted their Minjung theology which is similar to the Catholic *Befreiungstheologie*.<sup>23</sup> The driving religious force in Korea's democratic movement was, however, the 'unofficial' Catholic Church. The position of the official Korean Catholic Church was not to become involved in politics. It was only a group of Korean church leaders who advocated activism. About twenty percent of Korean Catholics were sympathisers of the Catholic democratic movement and another five percent activists.<sup>24</sup> The year 1974 was a watershed in the political history of the Korean Catholic Church: Bishop Chi Hak-sun of Wonju was imprisoned for his criticism of the regime. Consequently, several Catholics formed the *Catholic Priests' Association for Justice*, which soon became the centre of the democratic movement. Other Catholic organisations followed.<sup>25</sup> Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul was the home of the leader of the movement: Cardinal Kim. He openly criticised the regime on various occasions and initiated numerous street demonstrations.

After the regime transition, the official Catholic Church was credited with having contributed to the transition, although it was strictly opposed to Cardinal Kim's involvement and called for the disbanding of the various organisations that had been formed in the aftermath of Bishop Chi's imprisonment.

### **Changes in the policies of external actors and new institutions**

External actors significantly contributed to the Third Wave and were of two types: individual states and supranational bodies. A distinction may also be made between measures involving policies and those consisting of projects.<sup>26</sup> Supranational bodies, such as the European Community and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe had no impact on the transitions in East Asia. "political aid" projects of individual states,

such as Germany and the US, played a minor role in causing the area's Third Wave. However, the changing policies of the United States regarding human rights did have a tremendous impact on the transition in South Korea and even more on that in Taiwan. Representative Donald Fraser's Subcommittee on International Organisations and Movements initiated the change in the early 1970s. A committee report emphasised the necessity of promoting human rights and recommended a variety of actions to achieve that goal. In 1974, the US Congress, as a consequence, added human rights amendments to the *Foreign Assistance Act*, the *Mutual Assistance Act* and the *Trade Reform Act*. Later, similar amendments were also made to the *International Financial Institution Act* stipulating that no assistance could be given to "any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights." In 1976, the US Congress established the position of Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the Department of State, this being later upgraded to Assistant Secretary. Congressional legislation also required that an annual report on human rights practices (Country Reports) be submitted to Congress.<sup>27</sup> Under the Carter administration human rights became even more of a key issue in US foreign policy. President Carter wanted to place human rights on "the world agenda". One of the consequences of this was the suspension of economic assistance to several countries. In other cases the Carter Administration opposed loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions to countries flagrantly violating human rights, and took steps to ensure that food aid to countries with serious human rights problems actually reached the needy.<sup>28</sup> The Reagan administration first tried to play down the importance of human rights, but later President Reagan was forced to change his position due to the pressure from Congress.<sup>29</sup> Congress sent the first strong message to the Reagan administration in 1981 when the Republican-dominated Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted against Reagan's candidate for the position of Assistant Secretary. Congress felt that Reagan's nominee was opposed to human rights policies, at least as Congress and the Carter administration had defined them.<sup>30</sup>

In the Korean case, the US did not initially intervene in the government's ill treatment of the opposition due to the tensions with North Korea: It preferred a stable dictatorship to a possible unstable democracy. The situation changed in the mid-1980s when South Korea adopted the so-called 'Nordpolitik', easing tensions with communist countries in general. In February 1987, Gaston Sigur, then assistant secretary of state for Asia-Pacific affairs, sent a cautionary warning to Seoul indicating that bilateral relations depended on

the regime's creating "a more open and legitimate political system."<sup>31</sup> In May of the same year, George Schultz, then secretary of state, visited Seoul with a clear message to the regime that the US expected the political stalemate over the issue of constitutional amendment to be resolved peacefully. As the situation worsened, President Ronald Reagan sent a letter to Chun Doo Huan urging him to establish a democratic political environment. A few days later, on 23 June, Reagan dispatched Sigur again to assess the situation and to find a solution to the deepening crisis.<sup>32</sup> In addition, the US Congress voiced strong concern over the regime's handling of the crisis and urged the regime to find a peaceful way to resolve it.<sup>33</sup>

In the case of Taiwan, US influence on the KMT government's decision to implement democracy came from Congress, in the form of congressional hearings and resolutions, and from the administration, in the form of public statements. It should be noted that it was mainly US Congress that openly and frequently criticised the KMT regime for not doing enough to bring about democracy in Taiwan. The State Department issued hardly any substantive comments on or condemnations of Taiwan's political development. Its annual reports on human rights practices were the main, if not the only, source of criticism.<sup>34</sup> As to US Congress, critiques came mostly from Representatives Solarz and Leach, and Senators Pell and Kennedy. In 1986, they even organised the Committee for Democracy in Taiwan, which publicly supported views expressed by the Formosan Association for Public Affairs, a US-based organisation calling for fully-fledged democracy in an independent Taiwan nation-state.<sup>35</sup> Pressure on the Nationalist regime in Taipei increased considerably after the passing of the Taiwan Relations Act: In 1979, the United States cut diplomatic ties with Taipei and recognised the regime in Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China. Shortly afterwards, US Congress (Senate 90:6; House of Representatives 345:55) passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which restored relations between Washington and Taipei. The TRA was the basis of direct US intervention in the process of Taiwan's democratisation, since it had been approved by Congress expecting the KMT government to promote political reforms in Taiwan. This was particularly true of human rights:

Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the United States in human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all the approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and

enhancement of the human rights of all the people of Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objective of the United States (TRA Section 2.6c).

Senator Clairborne Pell (D.-Rhode Island) and Congressman Edward J. Derwinsky (D.-Illinois) initiated this human rights provision in their attempt to make the regime in Taipei respect the political rights and civil liberties of all the island's inhabitants.<sup>36</sup> Consequently, Taiwan was under close observation by the US Congress and the Department of State and other US government agencies. John F. Copper notes that "few other nations in the world have been under scrutiny to such an extent regarding human rights problems. The human rights provision in the TRA is the explanation for this scrutiny."<sup>37</sup>

### **Demonstration effect**

The demonstration effect played a more crucial role during the Third Wave than in the two previous waves of democratisation, due to the tremendous expansion of global communication and transportation that occurred after World War II.<sup>38</sup> In Southern Europe the effect was initiated by the downfall of the Portuguese regime in 1974: The Spanish and Greek opposition considered General Spínola to be a spiritual leader. The most dramatic demonstration effect in Eastern Europe was initiated when the Soviet Union acquiesced in the rise to power of non-communists in Poland in August 1989.<sup>39</sup> The downfall of Marcos in February 1986 and the role played by Cardinal Sin had a significant impact on Cardinal Kim's call for political changes in South Korea. In his speeches, he not only praised Cardinal Sin's achievements but also saw in him a spiritual leader. In Taiwan, opposition candidates in the 1986 parliamentary elections frequently claimed to be the nation-state's Corazon Aquino.<sup>40</sup> Democratisation in these polities in turn stimulated the demonstrations in Burma in the summer of 1988 and China in the autumn of 1986 and again in the spring of 1989.<sup>41</sup>

### **Consolidating democracies**

Once a polity has democratised, the problem of consolidation arises. In general, it is assumed that this consolidation simply means an improvement in the overall quality of democracy. The measurement of this "overall quality" is usually a product of analyses of electoral politics and market mechanisms. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, however, note that "democratic consolidation requires much more than elections and markets."<sup>42</sup> Rather, a consolidated democracy is a political situation in which democracy has become

“the only game in town”.<sup>43</sup> Schmitter notes that the consolidation of democracy “could be defined as the process of transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms and contingent solutions which have emerged during the transition from autocracy into relations of cooperation and competition that are reliably known, regularly practised and voluntarily accepted by those persons or collectivities, i.e. politicians and citizens, who participate in democratic governance.”<sup>44</sup> Linz and Stepan elaborate on this definition and opine that a democratic regime is consolidated when no significant part within the polity attempts to create a non-democratic regime, when the majority of the people, even under severe economic crises or deep dissatisfaction, believe that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way of governing the country, and when governmental and non-governmental forces alike “become habituated to the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.”<sup>45</sup>

### **Consolidation in (South)East Asia**

Democratic consolidation in (South)East Asia’s new democracies has been confronted with two major obstacles to a varying degree:

- (i) patron-client relationships, and
- (ii) lack of local self-governance.

Patron-client relationships exist in all the new democracies of the region and comprise three elements:<sup>46</sup>


- a relationship between two parties of unequal status,
- an exchange of non-homogeneous goods and services, and
- an interpersonal relationship based upon particularistic criteria regulating this exchange.

There are two main subtypes of patron-client relationships (Figure 1): traditional patronage and party-directed patronage. The first is predominately found in agrarian societies and the latter in industrial societies. Party-directed patronage further falls into two categories: machine patronage and social-integration patronage. The advantage of machine patronage is that political parties do not have to allocate their own resources to obtain electoral support. Social-integration patronage is based on the concept of infiltrating society through various networks, such as interest groups, as to determine voting behav-

our. This type requires strong party networks and de-facto control over civic organisations, such as labour and farmer’s organisations.

The nature and scope of these patron-client relationships thus differ from one country to another. On the Philippines, traditional patronage dominates, as this country is a predominantly agrarian society where feudalism shapes the political and social spheres. In Thailand, party-directed patronage is becoming more common, whereas in the past traditional patronage was the dominant form. In South Korea, party-directed patronage in the form of machine patronage is widespread and has replaced the traditional patronage system. In Taiwan, social-integration patronage is the most dominant form followed by machine patronage. Traditional patronage plays virtually no role at all.

**FIGURE 1: TYPES OF PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS**



The consequences of any form of patronage are overtly negative for consolidating democracies. Vote buying is one of them and is reported to be widespread in Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand. Patrons provide voters with money usually ranging between €10 and €50 in exchange for their support at the ballot box. In contrast to vote buying, which is individualistic in nature and predominantly found in industrial societies, is the gregarious vote, which is collective and predominantly found in agrarian societies. Rouquié writes about the gregarious vote:

Groups of voters are organised to ballot. They are transported, lodged, fed, entertained and may even receive small presents. The election is a festival that breaks the monotony of their days. Feasting and drinking reward organised civil zeal. The citizens are herded to the ballot boxes.<sup>47</sup>

Patron-client relationships have influenced election processes in almost all polities and are not an exclusively Asian phenomenon as commonly claimed in media reports and even academic journals. Rouquié points out that machine patronage was widespread and systematic in the US before and after World War I, when the boss of a company, for example, brought often-indispensable assistance to immigrants and foreign minorities in crowded city areas in exchange for votes. Machine patronage led in several cases to the establishment of local dictatorships. Frank L. Hague of New Jersey and Huey P. Long of Louisiana are the most well-known examples here.<sup>48</sup> The gregarious vote, on the other hand, has been a common occurrence in Brazil and other Latin American countries.

Although vote buying is not an instrument capable of fostering democratic gains, it would be unwise to classify all new democracies in East Asia as undemocratic simply because of the fact that vote buying is practised there. The impact of vote buying and the gregarious vote on the electoral process diminishes with urbanisation and an expanding middle class. Observations of vote-buying practices in Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand have proved these assumptions to be correct. Thailand has the worst record of vote buying and is also the least developed of the three polities in political, social and economic terms. With eighty percent of its populace living in rural areas, patron-client relationships flourish. Taiwan and South Korea are among the world's largest economies, with a far larger middle class and a rural population of only fifteen percent. The incidence of vote buying has drastically decreased in these two polities over the last few years, especially in Taiwan.

The second major obstacle to democratic consolidation in the NEAD except for Taiwan, is the lack of local self-governance or delayed de-centralisation. Seong states three major reasons why local self-governance is important for the overall democratisation process:

First, democratisation at the national level does not automatically bring about democratisation at the local level because "authoritarian cleavages" can persist in many local areas for a quite long period even after the national government and parliament are democratically elected. Second, therefore, local democratisation and decentralisation are one of the critical conditions for the successful consolidation of democracy since they provide citizens with ample opportunities for participation, civic education, and training of leadership. Democratic culture is thus nourished and democracy is entrenched as "the

only game in town.” Third, local democracy, practiced in close proximity to people, best serves the principle of popular sovereignty. As de Tocqueville wrote in 1835: “In the township, as well as everywhere else, the people are the source of power; but nowhere do they exercise their power more immediately.” In his sense, local democracy is an end in itself as well as the fountain of national-level democracy.<sup>49</sup>

The problem of centralisation and consequent lack of democracy has been the issue of heated debates in Thailand and South Korea, especially at the time when both of these two countries entered the process of democratisation.

In the case of South Korea, local autonomy was feared by the regime because it doubted the grassroots support of the population. Only President Rhee Syngman (1948-1960) supported the idea of local self-governance and was thus supportive of the Local Autonomy Act of 1949, which he implemented in 1952. The reason for his support was mainly to use local elections as an instrument to show the National Assembly members his popular support. This was necessary because presidents at the time were elected by the National Assembly, which was controlled by the opposition. Rhee Syngman was successful in getting the people’s support in local elections, the first such local election being held in 1952. Depending on the level of administration, chief executives were either appointed or indirectly elected. Rhee Syngman’s strategy worked out. Local autonomy was accorded more rights in 1956 with corresponding amendments to the Local Autonomy Act.<sup>50</sup>

- Indirect elections of chief executives of the lower-level local governments were replaced by direct elections.
- The local council’s power to take a vote of no-confidence for the local chief executive was abolished to mitigate the conflicts between local councils and local chief executives.

When Rhee Syngman realised that support for him on the local level was weakening, he reversed his policy in 1958 with a further amendment to the Local Autonomy Act. This abolished the direct election of chief executives and replaced it by appointments.<sup>51</sup>

After a successful student revolt in 1960, local autonomy was untrammelled for several months and brought about direct elections of local council members. Voter turnout in elections at the higher level (shi, do) averaged 67 percent and at lower level (gu, shi, gun) 63 percent. A year later, however, the military regime under Park Jung Hee (1961-1979) took over the country and suspended local self-governance. In accordance with Ordinance No.4 of the Military Revolution Commission, all councils were dissolved and a new law on local governance was promulgated. This law gave the Ministry of the Interior the sole power to govern local units of administration. The military leadership under Chun Doo Hwan (1980-1987) did not change this centralised system for the better until it was forced to do so by large-scale demonstrations in 1987. Since then, three local elections have been held, with election turnout averaging 55 percent in 1991, 68 percent in 1995, and 52 percent in 1998.<sup>52</sup>

Thailand has been confronted with a similar situation. Direct elections of local chief executives and council members were unknown to the Thai people until the late 1990s. Before then, the decision-making power of the local entities had been severely restricted, with all major decisions made by the powerful Ministry of the Interior. In the mid-1990s Prime minister Chuan Leekpai tried to significantly strengthen the democratic procedures by giving more decision-making power to local councils at sub-district level (tambon). He also endeavoured to push for reforms requiring the direct election of provincial governors. His decentralisation plan, however, faced strong opposition from the Ministry of the Interior and the appointed Senate.<sup>53</sup> At about the same time, a constitution drafting committee was established to prepare a new, more democratic constitution. The committee comprised people from all walks of life. Apart from the committee itself, the general public contributed to the drafting of the new constitution by participating in numerous discussions, some of which were even broadcast on television and radio. The new constitution was finally promulgated in 1997. Article 78 stipulates that the State should decentralise powers to localities for the purpose of independence and self-determination of local affairs. In accordance with Article 285, local council members and chief executives have to be elected either by the people or by the council. Provincial governors are now elected directly by universal suffrage whereas mayors are elected by the members of the respective councils, who in turn are elected by the people. Although decentralisation has proved to be a difficult task given the fact that the Thai people had not been familiar with local self-governance for decades before the implementation of the 1997 constitution, it is a vital step forward in the nation's future political development.

Taiwan stands in sharp contrast to all the other new East Asian and Southeast Asian democracies, having practised fully-fledged local self-governance since the arrival of the new regime, the Kuomintang, shortly after World War II. The Kuomintang learned from its failures in the Civil War, realising that Mao had won the battle simply because the KMT lacked grassroots support. The party leadership under Chiang Kai-shek thus adopted the strategy of infiltrating Taiwan's society by co-opting local elites through elections and offering a benefit-linked party membership. As history proved, the KMT's strategy worked out perfectly. Elections of Taiwan provincial councillors, city councillors, city mayors, and village chiefs were first held in 1946 by universal suffrage. Throughout the martial law period (1949-1987), all local public officials were regularly elected with voter turnout averaging seventy percent. Moreover, all elections were direct ones, except for the governor of Taiwan province and the mayors of Taiwan's largest cities, Taipei and Kaoshiung, who were appointed by the premier. Although there was an overwhelming dominance of elected KMT candidates in local elections, these elections were by no means without significance. They worked as a social and political stabiliser: The regime saw in them an instrument to expand its party machine, and the opposition viewed them as a key to a democratic opening and thus actively participated in them. The local elections in 1977 became a watershed in Taiwan's democratisation: Opposition candidates won two out of sixteen magistracies, two out of four mayoral posts and twenty-two out of seventy-seven provincial assembly seats. The success of the opposition took the regime by surprise and proved that (local) elections were indeed the key to a democratic opening. Taiwan has evolved into the most stable and most democratised polity of all new East Asian democracies. Fully-fledged local self-governance is without a doubt one of the reasons behind this phenomenon.<sup>54</sup>

Apart from the difficulties arising from patron-client relationships and the lack of local self-governance, there are other - more indigenous - obstacles to the ongoing consolidation process in the region's new democracies, among them being Korean regionalism and the media monopoly of Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand. Yet, optimism is appropriate with regard to the future political developments of these democracies, except for the Philippines, where feudalism seems unlikely to be abolished within the decades to come.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1947), p.269.
- <sup>2</sup> Robert A Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 3.
- <sup>3</sup> Freedom House, *Freedom in the World: the Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1997-1998* (New York: Transaction, 1998), p.597.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>7</sup> Freedom House, *Freedom in the World: the Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1998-1999* (New York: Transaction, 1999), pp. 5, 566.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- <sup>9</sup> Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 45.
- <sup>10</sup> Günther Siemers, "Sonderteil Staat Mongolei," *China Aktuell* (August 1995), p.691.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p.693.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p.694.
- <sup>14</sup> Seongyi Yun, "Democratisation in South Korea: Social Movements and Their Political Opportunity Structures," *Asian Perspective*, vol. 21, No. 3 (1997), p.165.
- <sup>15</sup> Linda Chao and Ramon Myers, "The first Chinese Democracy: political Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan," *Asian Survey*, vol. XXXIV, No. 3 (1994), p. 223.
- <sup>16</sup> Chai-Anan Samudavanija and Parichart Chotiya, "Beyond Transition in Thailand," in Larry Diamond and Marc F Plattner, eds., *Democracy in East Asia* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 150.
- <sup>17</sup> Clark D Neher, "The Transition to Democracy in Thailand," *Asian Perspective*, vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall-Winter 1996), p.308.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* pp.310-311.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* p.46.
- <sup>20</sup> Yun, "Democratisation in South Korea", p.163.
- <sup>21</sup> Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 77-79.
- <sup>22</sup> Carsten Wippermann, "Die gesellschaftliche Rolle der Kirchen in Südkorea." (October 2000) at <http://www.asienhaus.org/publikat/korea/kofo1-99/kirchen.htm>
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>26</sup> Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, "The Rise of 'Political Aid'," in Larry Diamond, Marc F Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien, eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 296.
- <sup>27</sup> Judith Ines de Neufville, "Human Rights Reporting as a Policy Tool: an Examination of the State Department Country Reports," *Human Rights Quarterly*, vol. 8, No. 4 (1986), p. 684.
- <sup>28</sup> Warren Christopher, "The Diplomacy of Human Rights: the First Year," in Barry M Rubin and Elizabeth P Spiro, eds., *Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Westview, 1979), p. 262.
- <sup>29</sup> Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 92.
- <sup>30</sup> de Neufville, "Human Rights," p. 688.
- <sup>31</sup> Yun-han Chu, Fu Hu and Chung-in Moon, "South Korea and Taiwan: the International Context," in Larry Diamond, Marc F Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien, eds.,

Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p.276.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 277.

<sup>33</sup> House Resolution 141; Senat Resolution 241.

<sup>34</sup> Cheng-yi Lin, "The US Factor in Taiwan's Political Development," in Jaw-ling Joanna Chang, ed., ROC-USA Relations (Taipei: Wan Pang, 1991), p.135.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 133.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

<sup>37</sup> John F Copper, China Diplomacy: the Washington – Taipei –Beijing Triangle (Boulder, Westview, 1992), p. 123.

<sup>38</sup> Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 101.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 103-105.

<sup>40</sup> John F Copper, "Taiwan's recent Elections: Fulfilling the Democratic Promise," Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, vol. 101, No. 6 (1990), p. 59.

<sup>41</sup> Huntington, The Third Wave, pp.103-105.

<sup>42</sup> Juan J Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Towards Consolidated Democracies: Five Arenas and Three Surmountable Obstacles," Paper presented at the International Conference on Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Trends and Challenges (Taipei: Institute of National Policy Research, 1995) p. 3.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>44</sup> Philippe C Schmitter, "On Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy: ten general Propositions and nine Speculations about their Relation in Asian Societies," Paper presented at the International Conference on Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Trends and Challenges (Taipei: Institute of National Policy Research, 1995), p. 3.

<sup>45</sup> Linz and Stepan, "Towards Consolidated Democracies," pp. 1-2.

<sup>46</sup> Alain Rouquié, "Clientelist Control and Authoritarian Contexts," in Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquié, eds., Elections without choice (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 23.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>49</sup> Kyoung-Ryung Seong, "Delayed Decentralisation and Incomplete Consolidation of Democracy: the Case of Korean Local Autonomy," Asian Perspective, vol. 22, No. 1 (1998), p.110.

<sup>50</sup> Korea Local Authorities Foundation for International Relations (KLAFIR), Local Government in Korea (Seoul: Chang-soo Moon, 1999), p. 31.

<sup>51</sup> Seong, "Delayed Decentralisation," p. 114.

<sup>52</sup> KLAFIR, Local Government, pp. 31-33; National Election Commission, Seoul.

<sup>53</sup> Neher, "The Transition," p. 313.

<sup>54</sup> Christian Schafferer, "Electoral Politics in Martial Law Taiwan" (Ph.D. diss., University of Linz, 2001).

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